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Abstract
Theory cannot provide an unambiguous prediction regarding the eco-
nomic eﬀects of employment protection laws. Such laws confer benefits on
employees and shift the labour supply curve to the right. But they also
impose costs on business and therefore shift the labour demand curve to
the left. The net eﬀect on employment is ambiguous and depends on the
magnitudes of the costs and benefits as well as the elasticities of labour
supply and labour demand. The net eﬀect on welfare is also ambiguous.
However, since many businesses did not provide protection against unfair
dismissal in the 1990s one can argue that that indicates that the costs
exceed the benefits and thus the unfair dismissal laws introduced in 1993
reduced employment and welfare.
Reduced form models that use employment or unemployment as the
dependent variable are useless for identifying and measuring the economic
eﬀects of unfair dismissal laws. Structural models or survey based evidence
is required to answer these questions.
Evidence from a survey of 1800 businesses establishes that unfair dis-
missal laws impose significant costs on businesses and cause them to make
major changes to the way in which they hire and fire workers. An esti-
mated lower bound on these costs is $296 per full time employee. This
is a lower bound in part because some business said unfair dismissal laws
raised their costs but were unable to quantify by how much. Also, the
opportunity cost in terms of lost productivity of continuing to employ
those workers whose performance is unsatisfactory is excluded from the
calculation above.
Evidence from the 1990 and 1995 AWIRS survey shows that dismissal
rates for cause declined from 4.4 per cent to 2.1 per cent and may have
declined even further in the past decade. This suggests that the lost
productivity from retaining unsatisfactory employees is likely to be high.
The AWIRS data shows that in 1990 small and medium sized busi-
nesses were more likely than larger business to dismiss employees for cause.
The 1995 AWIRS survey shows that small and medium sized businesses
made much larger adjustments to their firing practices and thus shoul-
dered more of the burden of these laws.
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Discussion of unfair dismissal laws has ignored the fact that these laws
increase the risk born by businesses. Small business is unable to pool this
risk and so it poses a much greater cost for such businesses. This feature
may also explain why small businesses reported that they spent more on
complying with and reducing their exposure to unfair dismissal laws.
These considerations suggest that the Government’s policy of exempt-
ing businesses with fewer than 100 employees from the unfair dismissal
laws will most likely not cause major resource allocation costs. But a
better policy would be abolish the unfair dismissal laws.
Using a labour demand elasticity of 0.7 percent I estimate that the
existing unfair dismissal laws reduce employment by at least 0.46 per cent
(about 46,000 employees).
Freyens and Oslington question my findings. There are two mistakes
in their paper that account for their position. First they underestimate by
a factor of 10 the probability that a worker is dismissed for cause. Second,
they exclude the costs incurred by business in avoiding exposure to the
law and focus only on the cost of complying with the law. Both their
paper and my paper can be criticised for underestimating costs because
we exclude the foregone productivity that arises where businesses retain
some employees whose performance is unsatisfactory and who would have
been dismissed under an employ-at-will regime.
1 Introduction
The Australian Government’s WorkChoices (2005) Bill makes major changes to
unfair dismissal laws and related legislation. These changes are in three main
parts.
1. All businesses falling within the corporations powers will be brought under
Federal Unfair Dismissal laws;
2. An exemption from the Federal Unfair Dismissal laws is provided for busi-
nesses with up to 100 employees;
3. The Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations will be able to
prohibit employees and employers from placing certain provisions in agree-
ments – the so called prohibited content. At this stage no regulations
are in place but in the WorkChoices document the Government says that
it will prohibit the inclusion in agreements of provisions related to unfair
dismissals.
The debate about these laws is concerned with the following questions:
• Do existing unfair dismissal laws have any economic eﬀects?
• If so, what are those economic eﬀects?
• Will the government’s proposed changes to unfair dismissal laws make
things better or worse?
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Many authors have used reduced form regressions with either employment or
unemployment as the dependent variable in attempting to answer the question
of whether employment protection laws have any economic eﬀects . Addison and
Teixeira (2003) provide a summary of that literature. As is discussed in section
2, economic theory tells us that this approach is unable to provide a conclusive
answer. The reason is that employment protection laws can have important
economic eﬀects without influencing either employment or unemployment.1
Given that reduced form regressions are largely uninformative on this issue,
researchers need to use other sources of information such as identified structural
models, surveys of business or revealed preference arguments.
Identified structural models are costly to construct and thus survey based
evidence and revealed preference arguments have a role in establish whether
there is suﬃcient evidence to justify developing structural models to study the
eﬀect of employment protection laws. Using revealed preference arguments and
evidence from a survey of 1800 businesses with less than 200 full-time employees
I show that unfair dismissal laws do have economic eﬀects.2
Given that unfair dismissal laws have economic eﬀects attention then turns to
the task of identifying the nature of those eﬀects, quantifying them and assessing
whether the net benefit is positive or negative. Sections 3 and 4 summarise
the evidence from the survey reported in Harding (2002) on the intended and
unintended eﬀects of unfair dismissal laws.
The costs imposed on business is quantified in section 5 drawing on both
the information in Harding (2002) and in Freyens and Oslington (2005). I show
that Freyens and Oslington (2005) underestimate the costs of unfair dismissal
laws. This arises for three main reasons. First, evidence from the 1990 and
1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (AWIRS) shows that
Freyens and Oslington underestimate by a factor of ten the probability that a
worker is dismissed for cause. Second, Freyens and Oslington focus solely on the
cost incurred in making a dismissal. That is, they ignore the cost incurred by
business in managing and dealing with those poor performers who would have
previously been dismissed for cause. These costs are included in Harding (2002)
and this explains the remaining part of the diﬀerence between Harding (2002)
and Freyens and Oslington (2005) in the estimated average cost per employee of
the unfair dismissal laws. The third source of cost is the diﬀerence between the
marginal product of those who would have previously been dismissed for cause
and the cost to the business of continuing to employing these workers. This last
cost is ignored by Harding (2002) as well as Freyens and Oslington.
Unfair dismissal laws also increase a businesses exposure to risk. Section 6
explores how this exposure to risk is related to business size and shows that this
1This point seems lost on the OECD who have initiated a mini industry producing such
reduced form regressions.
2The survey is described in appendix A.
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feature provides a partial rational for the exemption of businesses with less than
100 employees.
Policy issues and conclusions are discussed in section 7
2 Do existing unfair dismissal laws have any eco-
nomic eﬀects?
Lawyers, policy makers, politicians, business people and journalists find this an
unusual question since they typically assume that employment protection laws
modify behaviour and thus have economic eﬀects. What they disagree about is
the nature of the eﬀects. One side typically sees the laws as having beneficial
eﬀects in terms of protecting "employees rights" the other side typically sees the
laws as imposing costs on employers who respond by reducing employment. The
latter group gained support from Lindbeck and Snower (1988) who argued that
hiring and firing costs increase the bargaining power of insiders (the employed)
relative to outsiders (the unemployed). According to Lindbeck and Snower
the insiders use their increased bargaining power to obtain higher wages which
results in increased unemployment.3
Some academic economists became sceptical during the 1990’s about the ef-
fects of employment protection and minimum wage laws. Nickell and Layard
(1999, p3030), for example, observed that compared with worrying about the
eﬀects of unions and social security systems “time spent worrying about strict
labour market regulations, employment protection and minimum wages is prob-
ably time largely wasted”.
This scepticism has a theoretical foundation that is based on Jovanovic
(1979) and Lazear (1987). Jovanovic points out that in a world of wage flexibil-
ity a firm never needs to dismiss a worker rather they can adjust the wage so that
it is below the employee’s reservation wage, thereby inducing the employee to
voluntarily quit. Jovanovic’s point is an important one because it makes it clear
that concepts such as quits, redundancy and fires for cause are all endogenous
and can only be interpreted against the institutional framework of a particular
economy. For example, if a mandated minimum wage is binding or if employees
3 It is not clear that Lindbeck and Snower’s (1988) proposition is valid in general. In
a bargaining model, tighter employment protection laws have several counteracting eﬀects.
First, to the extent that they increase business costs they will reduce the business profit per
worker. Also if employment protection laws reduce the probability a worker is hired from
the pool of unemployed then those laws will reduce the weigt placed on the outside wage,
increase the weight placed on unemployment benefits and thus reduce the expected value of
the employees outside alternative when bargaining. That is, in a bargaining context, tighter
employment protection laws may not increase the wage and they may not reduce employment.
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are covered by collective agreements that do not allow adjustment of an individ-
ual employee’s wages then it becomes necessary for the employer to terminate
the employment relation in the case of redundancy or poor performance.4
Lazear (1987) goes further and points out that if firms and workers are free
to contract then they can implement eﬃcient agreements that undo the eﬀects
of employment protection laws. Lazear’s point is important but one should not
overemphasise its reach. It only operates when the employment protection laws
result in eﬃcient transfers between firms and workers as these can be undone by
an eﬃcient contract. Lazear’s point does not apply where the hiring and firing
laws result in deadweight loss such as legal costs and transactions costs. The
latter cannot be undone by eﬃcient contracting.
In some circumstances the optimal contract between a firm and its employees
will include provisions that impose firing costs on the firm. These contractual
arrangements can arise, for example, where firm-specific training is required
and it is optimal to share the costs between the firms and its workers – Booth
and Chatterji (1989) develop such a model. However, this model relates to
redundancy in the event of demand shocks and it does not have many implica-
tions regarding dismissal for cause. Pissarides (2001) develops a model in which
employment protection arrangements arise as part of an optimal risk sharing
contract between a firm and its workers. Pissarides’ model relates to redun-
dancy and not to dismissal for cause. It is doubtful if a risk sharing argument
could be made in defense of unfair dismissal laws.
Thus, two additional considerations need to be taken into account when as-
sessing the impact of employment protection laws. The first, and more obvious
consideration, is that the laws are only restrictive to the extent that the man-
dated provisions are stricter than the provisions that would arise endogenously
through optimal contracting. A second, and less obvious consideration, arises
because, in the presence of costs of writing and enforcing contracts, the existence
of a body of law related to hiring and firing will influence what provisions are
included in contracts related to hiring and firing. For example, it may be that
it is no longer worthwhile for businesses and employees to include in contracts
provisions related to firing that are close, in eﬀect, to the mandated provisions.
The discussion above makes the point that one cannot use economic theory
to determine the eﬀects of employment protection laws, empirical evidence is
required. The strongest evidence that these laws have economic eﬀects is arises
from the amount of lobbying eﬀort that is put in by unions who seek to defend
and extend the laws and by employer groups who typically oppose the laws and
seek to have them weakened or reduced in their coverage. Time and money are
scarce for both of these groups and it is inconceivable that they would seek to
4 If bonuses are a suﬃciently large component of remuneration then this provides employers
with a mechanism for inducing quits.
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spend large amounts of these resources defending or attacking the laws if those
laws did not confer benefits to employed labour and costs on employers.
Given the power of this revealed preference argument I feel that most time
should be spent on
• Identifying the economic eﬀects (including distributional and equity ef-
fects) of unfair dismissal laws;
• Accurately measuring those eﬀects; and
• Weighing the costs and benefits to come to an overall assessment of the
net eﬀect of these laws.
Nonetheless because of the extensive econometric work that has been un-
dertaken, some time needs to be spent on discussing whether that work can
shed any light on the issue of whether unfair dismissal laws have any economic
eﬀects.
2.1 Econometric evidence
The empirical work on the eﬀects of employment protection legislation that is
surveyed in Addison and Teixeira (2003) has two distinguishing features. First,
all of the empirical work involves estimating reduced form equation(s). Second,
some measure of employment or unemployment is used as the variable to be
explained in the reduced form equation. The fundamental problem with this
approach is that the changes in employment protection laws can:
• have significant economic eﬀects without changing the equilibrium level of
employment; and
• result in an increase in the unemployment rate even if the increase change
in the employment protection laws are welfare improving.
In a perfectly competitive economy without frictions the eﬀect on employ-
ment of tightening employment protection laws is ambiguous. Tightening of
such laws has two eﬀects. First, it increases the costs to business of hiring
labour and therefore shifts the labour demand curve down to the left from LD0
to LD1 as is shown in Figure 1. Second, tightening such laws provides a benefit
to employees in terms of improved protection against procedural unfairness. If
this is valued by employees it will result in an increased amount of labour being
oﬀered at each wage rate – that is the labour supply curve shifts to the right
from LS0 to LS1 in Figure 1. I have drawn Figure 1 so that the net impact
on employment is zero. Of course, in practice the net eﬀect on employment
could either be negative or positive and this demonstrates the problem of us-
ing employment as an indicator of whether employment protection laws have
an economic eﬀect. In a perfectly competitive economy the signal of whether
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employment protection laws have an eﬀect is provided by the real wage, as is
shown in Figure 1, if the wage changes then it is clear that the laws have an
eﬀect.
Figure 1: Eﬀect on employment of increasing the tightness of employment pro-
tection laws is ambiguous in a pefectly competitive economy with no frictions
Real 
wage
Labour
LD0LD1 LS0
LS1
L0=L1
W0
W1
The point of the preceding example is to illustrate the problems with using
employment as an indicator of whether employment protection laws have any
economic eﬀects.
Few people would argue that any labour market is well approximated by
perfect competition so it is of interest to look at departures from that ideal. One
important departure from perfect competition arises where the wage is set by a
government authority such as the Australian Industrial Relations Commission
(AIRC) or the Fair Pay Commission (FPC) rather than market forces. A useful
starting point is to assume that the wage is set exogenously as in Figure 2 below.
In this case tightening employment protection laws shifts the labour supply and
demand curves in the same way as for Figure 1. But in this case the real wage
is exogenous and all of the adjustment occurs via employment (which falls) and
unemployment (which increases by more than employment falls because the
labour force increases).
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of employment protection laws when the real wage is exogenous
Real 
wage
Labour
LD0LD1 LS0
LS1
EMP0
WExog
EMP1 LF0 LF1
So with an exogenous wage the eﬀect of tightening employment protection
laws is to unambiguously reduce employment and increase unemployment. No-
tice that if the law did not impose any cost to business (so the labour demand
curve does not shift to the left), but does confer a benefit on employees (so
the labour supply curve shifts to the right) then, the law would create unem-
ployment even though it is welfare improving. This, admittedly constructed,
example highlights the problem with the OECD approach of using changes in
employment and or unemployment as an indicator of the welfare eﬀects of unfair
dismissal laws.
It is unlikely that wages are set exogenously in any economy. A a more
realistic view of the world is that wage setting bodies such as the AIRC take
into account a range of factors including employment and unemployment.5 In
this situation after employment protection laws are tightened there is an initial
fall in employment and increase in unemployment and the wage setting authority
responds by lowering the wage. So in this case we are in a situation that falls
between the exogenous wage story and the market clearing wage story.
Thus, I conclude that reduced form econometric models with either, employ-
ment or unemployment as the dependent variable are of no use in determining
5 It is diﬃcult to sustain the position that the AIRC places no weight on employment and
unemployment. Rather the issue is whether the AIRC places suﬃcient weight on these factors.
8
whether changes to employment protection laws have any economic eﬀects. It
is true that if an adverse employment eﬀect is found to exist then one can con-
clude that economic eﬀects exist. But as is illustrated in Figure 1 the finding
of no impact on employment cannot be interpreted as evidence that the laws
have no economic impacts. This point does not depend on perfect competition
and will survive extension to search models, models of imperfect competition
and bargaining models. Essentially the point is that identified structural rather
than reduced form models are required if one seeks to evaluate the economic
eﬀects of changes to employment protection laws.
2.2 Survey based evidence
The problems associated with using reduced form econometric methods were one
factor motivating the approach taken by Harding (2002) which relies on survey
based evidence to establish whether unfair dismissal laws have any economic
eﬀects.
2.2.1 Methodological issues
Using survey based evidence raises some methodological issues that need to be
addressed briefly.6 A useful taxonomy of these issues is provided by Boulier and
Goldfarb (1998) who observe that survey questions fall into seven categories viz:
1. Facts of past or current economic life. Eg "Do you own a car?"
2. Facts about future intentions. Eg "Do you intend to buy a car next year?"
3. Measurement of hard to gauge variables. Eg "At what wage would you be
indiﬀerent between working and not working?"
4. Explanations of current or past behaviour. Eg "Why did you hire more
people last year?"
5. Predictions of future behaviour under counterfactual conditions. Eg "If
the minimum wage were frozen for five years would that alter your deci-
sions about how many people to employ?"
6. Participant or observer opinions and ideas. Eg "Is this course well taught?"
7. Assessing the interviewees information set. Eg "By how much did the
price level increase last year?"
6There is an extensive literature on these metodological issues with surveys, the literature
starts with the debate between Lester (1946) and Machlup (1946). Friedman (1953) article
states a strong methodological position against the use of certain types of survey questions
that ask how business people or consumer’s make decisions. Here Friedman’s objection is not
so much to the use of surveys rather he sees the research question that asks how people make
decisions as being outside of the realm of economists working in the marginalist paradigm.
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Rather than eschew any of these categories of question it seems to me that
economists should proceed to assess these questions much in the same way as
they assess econometric estimators. That is we should focus on the following
issues
• Is the particular category of question subject to bias? The main source
of bias arises where the respondent has an incentive to lie. Blinder (1991)
has suggested that "If the respondent has an reason to conceal the truth or
mislead the interviewer, this objection is probably a show stopper". This
is very much like the reaction to biased estimators forty years ago. Today,
econometricians frequently use biased estimators where some warrant can
be given that the bias is small in some sense. It seems that such a mindset
should be used with survey data.
• How big is the measurement error induced by the question;
• How robust is the question to alternative populations;
• What is the likely ratio of insight obtained from the question relative to
the cost; and
• What are the alternative methods of obtaining the information and what
are their ratios of insight obtained to cost.
2.2.2 Survey evidence that unfair dismissal laws have an economic
eﬀect
To provide evidence on whether unfair dismissal laws have any eﬀect on busi-
nesses, 1800 businesses with fewer than 100 full-time employees were asked the
following question,7
"Thinking about the processes and practices your business uses
to: recruit and select staﬀ, manage its workforce, and manage staﬀ
whose performance is unsatisfactory — which of the following state-
ments best describes the extent to which unfair dismissal laws influ-
ence the operation of your business?"
1. The laws have a major influence on what we do.
2. The laws have a moderate influence on what we do.
3. The laws have a minor influence on what we do.
4. The laws have no influence on what we do.
7This question was used as a screening question to ensure that businesses reporting no
eﬀect were not asked leading questions.
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The responses are in Table 1.
Because they are not asked whether the eﬀect is positive or negative, busi-
nesses have no incentive to lie in answering this question. Moreover, in the
taxonomy of questions given above it is simply a question of fact that is being
asked. Thus there is no reason to expect any bias in the response. As can be
seen from Table 1 the unfair dismissal laws have some eﬀect on the behaviour
of almost 70 per cent of small and medium sized businesses. But the extent of
the reported eﬀect varies from major to minor.
Table 1: Eﬀect of unfair dismissal laws on the behaviour of small and medium
sized businesses
Response Weighted
response (per
cent)
The laws have a major influence on what we do 23.3
The laws have a moderate influence on what we do 24.6
The laws have a minor influence on what we do 21.9
The laws have no influence on what we do 30.2
Total 100.0
Given that businesses are heterogenous and some businesses will optimally
include unfair dismissal procedures in their agreements with workers, this is the
pattern of responses that we should expect. The value of this question is that it
provides a useful insight into the proportion of businesses that are aﬀected by
unfair dismissal laws, something that cannot be achieved by regression methods
on aggregate panel or cross section data for economies.
Having established that the unfair dismissal laws are not undone via eﬃcient
contracting and thus have real economic eﬀects it is appropriate to turn to the
question of the nature of these eﬀects.
3 Intended eﬀects of unfair dismissal laws8
The main objective of UFD laws is to encourage firms to engage in better human
resource management practices particularly when dealing with workers whose
performance is unsatisfactory. One eﬀect of the law was to encourage 29.7 per
cent of firms to seek advice as to how to mitigate the eﬀect of UFD laws on their
businesses.9 Part of this advice will relate to how to improve human resource
management and can be considered as an intended eﬀect of the laws. However,
part of the advice will also relate to how to avoid being caught by the laws.
8This section is largely taken from Harding (2002).
9 Source Table 10 of Harding (2002).
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Unfair dismissal laws have induced 51.6 per cent of businesses to change
the procedures that they use when dealing with workers whose performance is
unsatisfactory.10 These changes are involve implementing the main practices
that are considered to be part of good human resource management of poor
performers:
• provide a warning;
• provide an opportunity to respond;
• provide workers who are about to be dismissed with reasons.
Table 2 provides details on the extent to which these practices are adopted
by businesses. Adopting these procedures for all employees imposes costs on
businesses. These costs are included in the estimates by Harding (2002) and
reported in section 5 below but are not included in Freyens and Oslingtons’
(2005) estimate of the costs of unfair dismissal laws.
Table 2: Procedures used when dealing with workers whose performance is
unsatisfactory
Response
Category
Uses formal
procedures
with worker
whose per-
formance is
unsatisfactory
Documents
in writing
an employ-
ees poor
performance
Provides a
worker whose
performance
is unsatisfac-
tory with a
warning
Provides a
worker whose
performance
is assessed as
unsatisfactory
with an op-
portunity to
respond
Provides
reasons to a
worker whose
performance
is considered
suﬃciently
unsatisfactory
to justify
termination
Describes
very well
31.4 34.4 42.0 40.9 42.1
Describes
somewhat
well
15.3 8.9 7.8 7.2 7.0
Does not de-
scribe at all
4.8 8.1 1.7 1.9 1.6
Don’t know <0.05 <0.05 <0.05 0.6 0.2
Refused <0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
Screened out 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
Total 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.
The choice of a legal remedy for UFD also creates two intended eﬀects that
are not necessarily beneficial.11 The first of these is increased formality in
10Source Table 10 of Harding (2002).
11 I categorise these as intended eﬀects as they are central to a legal remedy. Without
formalism and documentation the legal remedy would be unworkable as it requires evidence.
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procedures with workers whose performance is unsatisfactory. The second is
documentation in writing of a workers poor performance. As can be seen from
Table 2, while these strategies were less strongly evident than the three beneficial
strategies they were nonetheless very evident in firm responses to the UFD
laws. This raises two questions about the equity eﬀects of UFD laws. First do
they treat workers equally? Or does the increased formalism and reliance on
documentation disadvantage those workers that are less literate and less suited
to formal modes of supervision? These questions cannot be addressed fully
from the information in the current survey, however, in the next section I report
evidence that the increased formalism is viewed by management as making their
task more diﬃcult.
The unanswered question here is how much do workers value the procedural
improvements that are documented in Table 2.12 The fact that many businesses
did not provide coverage for unfair dismissal until the legislation was introduced
suggests that the benefit to employees is less than the cost to business of pro-
tecting workers against unfair dismissal.
4 Unintended eﬀects of the unfair dismissal laws13
Unintended eﬀects of UFD laws fall into three categories. The first of these
are eﬀects on recruitment and selection procedures. The second category of
unintended eﬀects relates to adverse eﬀects on management and supervision
practices. The third category of unintended eﬀect arises where the UFD laws
result in firms being less willing to dismiss workers whose performance is unsat-
isfactory.
4.1 Eﬀect on recruitment and selection procedures and
decision
Given that UFD laws have the eﬀect of making it harder to dismiss an employee
for poor performance it is natural for firms to react by changing their recruitment
and selection procedures so as to reduce their chance of hiring someone who
turns out to be a poor match or a poor performer. Addison and Teixeira (2003)
report evidence that this eﬀect seems to disadvantage the young.
Some 47.9 per cent of businesses reported that the UFD laws influenced their
recruitment and selection procedures.14 (see Table 3).
UFD laws have resulted in only a small increase in the use of fixed term
contracts by small and medium sized businesses, this is probably because given
12Recall from the discussion earlier the extent to which procedural fairness is valued by
employees determines the extent of the rightward shift in the labour supply curve.
13This section is largely taken from Harding (2002).
14 See Table 13 in Harding (2002).
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the high failure rates of small business such contracts would provide more per-
manency to employees than is aﬀorded by the standard employment contract
and it would be diﬃcult for small business to credibly commit to such contracts.
A more popular choice was the use of casual workers. This strategy has the ad-
vantage, for small business, of extending the use of a form of employment with
which they are very familiar. Increased employment of family and friends was
also about equally popular response by small business (see Table 3).
Table 3: Nature of eﬀect on recruitment and selection procedures
My business
puts more
employees on
fixed term
contracts
My busi-
ness employs
more casuals
and fewer
permanent
workers
My business
employs more
family and
friends
My business
uses longer
probationary
periods for
new employ-
ees
Because of
unfair dis-
missal laws
there are
certain types
of job appli-
cant that my
business is
less likely to
hire
Describes
very well
8.1 16.7 12.5 18.6 29.6
Describes
somewhat
well
3.5 4.6 8.2 8.0 9.9
Does not de-
scribe at all
35.8 26.6 27.3 20.7 6.9
Don’t know 0.5 0.7 0.7
Refused <0.05 0.1 0.8
Screened out 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The most frequently reported responses were use of longer probationary pe-
riods and screening out of certain types of job applicants. The former strategy
while understandable makes the probation period more diﬃcult for both employ-
ees and employers. This strategy also has important equity eﬀects on workers.
To understand this consider a worker who is a marginal match when viewed
from the perspective of their new employer. The UFD laws create an incentive
for the employer to lift the criteria used to determine what is satisfactory in
the probationary period. Thus one eﬀect of the UFD laws is that more people
will be dismissed in the probationary period. Such dismissals show up on the
worker’s CV either as terminations or as changes in job for no apparent reason.
When asked about what categories of job applicants they would be less
likely to hire 35.1 per cent of firms said that they would be less likely to hire
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someone who had changed jobs a lot for no apparent reason (see Table 4).
Thus the selection strategies UFD laws cause businesses to adopt, are likely to
disadvantage certain types of workers with consequent adverse eﬀects on equity
and on eﬃciency. The latter arises because the increased rate of dismissal in
probationary periods can lead to the person having a reduced chance of getting
a job. This adverse eﬀect of unfair dismissal laws on the probability of getting a
job is compounded for workers who become unemployed for more than one year
as the UFD laws make it far less likely that businesses will select job applicants
with these characteristics (see Table 4).
Table 4: Types of job applicant less likely to be hired because of unfair dismissal
laws
A person who
has changed
jobs a lot for
no apparent
reason
A person who
is currently
unemployed
A person who
has been un-
employed for
more than one
year
A person
who has been
unemployed
for more than
two years
Describes
very well
28.0 7.8 16.5 22.2
Describes
somewhat
well
7.1 8.1 10.9 8.1
Does not de-
scribe at all
4.1 23.3 12.0 9.1
Don’t know 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Refused 0.1 <0.05 <0.05 <0.05
Screened out 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
4.2 Eﬀect on supervision, management and performance
of employees
Some 46.1 per cent of businesses reported that the UFD laws influenced the way
in which their business supervised or managed employees. And, 44.3 per cent
of businesses reported that the UFD laws made it more diﬃcult to manage and
supervise their workforce. See Table 5.
When asked about the nature of adverse eﬀects some 38.9 per cent of busi-
nesses reported that the UFD laws reduced their authority over their workforce,
40.8 per cent reported that it now takes longer to resolve issues associated with
poor performance, 37.9 per cent reported that poor performance by one worker
is more likely to spill over and adversely influence the performance of other
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Table 5: Eﬀect of unfair dismissal laws on management supervision and perfor-
mance of employees
Law has eﬀect on
way business super-
vises and manages
employees
Law makes manage-
ment of workforce
more diﬃcult than it
would otherwise be
Describes very well 20.1 25.4
Describes somewhat well 26.0 18.9
Does not describe at all 22.9 25.2
Don’t know 0.6 0.2
Refused 0.3 0.1
Screened out 30.2 30.2
Total 100.0 100.0
workers (see Table 6). Again these costs are not included in the estimate of
costs presented in section 5.
Earlier it was observed that legal remedies require more formal interaction
between employees and employers, when asked about this some 38.3 per cent of
businesses reported that the increased formality required by the UFD laws made
communication with employees more diﬃcult. This is likely to be a significant
problem for small businesses where flexibility is part of their competitive advan-
tage. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the increased diﬃculty in communication
may well disadvantage certain types of employees with consequent adverse eq-
uity eﬀects.
4.3 Eﬀect on decisions to terminate a worker whose per-
formance is unsatisfactory
The objectives of unfair dismissal laws are to improve the fairness with which
employees are treated by encouraging employers to engage in fair and trans-
parent human resource management practices. Ideally, such laws would not
discourage employers from dismissing an employee whose performance is unsat-
isfactory. However, as reported in Table 7 for 37.5 per cent of firms the UFD
laws made it less likely that they would dismiss a worker whose performance is
unsatisfactory. This finding underscores the finding made above that businesses
felt that the UFD laws reduced their authority over their workforce.
It is useful to place this information against the perspective of the extent
to which small and medium sized business dismissed workers for cause. The
1990 and 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys show that
businesses dismissed 4.4 per cent and 2.1 per cent of workers for cause in 1990
and 1995 respectively.15 , 16
15 See Morehead (1997, p605 Table AA.5) for details.
16Presumably the reduction in dismissals for cause between 1990 and 1995 reflects the
introduction of the federal Industrial Relations Reform Act (1993) which provided employees
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Table 6: Nature of eﬀect of unfair dismissal laws on management and supervision
Reduce au-
thority my
business
has over its
workforce
Takes longer
to resolve
issues as-
sociated
with poor
performance
Poor per-
formance by
one worker is
more likely
to adversely
aﬀect the per-
formance of
other workers
More formal-
ity in dealing
with workers
makes com-
munication
between man-
agement and
employees
more diﬃcult
Describes very well 23.9 29.6 26.9 26.5
Describes somewhat well 15.0 11.2 11.0 11.8
Does not describe at all 5.2 3.1 6.1 5.8
Don’t know 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1
Refused 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Screened out 55.7 55.7 55.7 55.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 7: Eﬀect of unfair dismissal laws on decision to terminate a worker whose
performance is unsatisfactory
Unfair dismissal laws make it less likely that my business
would dismiss a worker whose performance is unsatisfac-
tory
Weighted re-
sponse
Describes very well 19.9
Describes somewhat well 17.6
Does not describe at all 30.9
Don’t know 1.2
Refused 0.1
Screened out 30.2
Total 100.0
17
As can be seen from Table 8 dismissals for cause are concentrated in busi-
nesses with less than 200 employees. This provides evidence as to why the federal
Industrial Relations Reform Act (1993) was met with such intense hostility by
small and medium sized businesses.
Table 8: Employees dismissed for cause as a percentage of all employees, 1990
and 1995
Number of Employees 1990 1995 Change be-
tween 1995
and 1990
5-19 4.5 2.5 2.0
20-49 5.7 2.5 3.2
50-99 3.9 2.2 1.7
100-199 3.0 1.3 1.7
200-499 1.8 0.8 1.0
500+ 1.0 0.5 0.5
All firms 4.4 2.1 2.3
Source: Morehead (1997) Table AA.5 p. 605.
The reduction in dismissal rates between 1990 and 1995 was most heavily
concentrated in businesses with less than 50 employees which again emphasises
that small and medium sized businesses felt the impact of the federal unfair
dismissal laws.
5 Cost impact of the unfair dismissal laws
5.1 The Harding (2002) survey17
Harding (2002) used the following question to obtain information on whether
unfair dismissal laws imposed costs on businesses,
Compared with a situation where there were no unfair dismissal
laws, unfair dismissal laws increase my businesses’ costs.18
One third of businesses reported that UFD laws increased their costs when
compared to a situation where there were no laws (see Table 9).
The cost impost of UFD laws is a very diﬃcult thing for businesses to quan-
tify. Most importantly, the economically relevant concept of cost is that of
with protection against, among other things, unfair dismissal.
17This section is largely taken from Harding (2002).
18This question was used to screen out those businesses where the law did not increase costs.
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Table 9: Eﬀect of unfair dismissal laws on businesses costs
Compared with a situation where there were no unfair
dismissal laws, unfair dismissal laws increase my busi-
nesses costs
Weighted re-
sponse
Describes very well 17.0
Describes somewhat well 16.4
Does not describe at all 34.7
Don’t know 1.5
Refused 0.2
Screened out 30.2
Total 100.0
opportunity cost. The latter concept includes not only direct costs but also
costs of actions or opportunities foregone as well costs of actions taken in re-
sponse to the law. For example, where firms employ more casual workers there
may be a diﬀerence between the cost to the firm of the same quantum of labour
purchased at casual rates and at permanent rates. The person interviewed in the
firm may not be fully aware of all of these costs as they are dispersed throughout
the firm. Thus it is likely that some respondents incorrectly responded that the
laws imposed no costs on their business. This latter concern is likely to be more
relevant in larger firms where, for example, the human resource manger, line
managers and supervisors may be more aware of the costs than is the CEO in
small businesses these functions are all rolled into the one job and thus there is
less likely to be under reporting of cost imposts by such firms.
In trying to quantify costs I felt that it was unlikely that those adminis-
tering the survey would be able to explain the concept of opportunity cost to
businesses. For this reason, I decided to focus on the costs of complying with
the unfair dismissal laws and the costs of reducing the businesses exposure to
the laws. The following question was then used to measure these components
of the cost to business of complying with unfair dismissal laws:
You have said that unfair dismissal laws increase your businesses’
costs. Thinking of the costs in time and money of complying with
the law and reducing your businesses’ potential for exposure to un-
fair dismissal claims. By how much, in dollars per year, do unfair
dismissal laws increase your businesses’ costs?
This question omits important components of opportunity cost such as lost
productivity from employees that the business would have formerly dismissed.
Thus, the responses provide an under estimate or lower bound on the cost to
small business of complying with UFD laws.
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Taking the reported costs and factoring them up to the population of small
and medium business yields an estimate of $1329 million as the cost to small
and medium sized businesses of complying with the UFD law. This estimate is
arrived at by assuming that the 18.2 per cent of businesses that reported a cost
impost but could not quantify the size of that cost impost actually experienced
a zero cost impost. Thus the estimate of $1329 million should be seen as a lower
bound (see Table 10). To put this figure in perspective it represents about 0.2
per cent of Australian annual GDP.
If those who could not quantify the cost increase have a similar cost increase
as those that did provide an estimate then, a more plausible estimate of the
cost increase would be $1625 million. The bulk of this cost increase is borne by
small business. However, one should exercise caution here as the discussion at
the top of this page suggests that there may be systematic under reporting of
costs by larger businesses.
Table 10: Estimated lower bound of cost impost from unfair dismissal laws by
size of business
Size of business (number of full-time employees)
1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 50 51 to 100 100+ Total
Total cost
($million)
436.709 225.213 177.990 271.218 119.825 98.327 1329.282
Employees
(million)
1.195 0.677 0.637 0.832 0.535 0.622 4.498
Average cost
per full time
employee ($)
365 333 279 326 224 158 296
The average cost of UFD laws vary considerably by industry. As is shown in
Table ??, Accommodation, Communications, Recreation, Transport and Manu-
facturing are the industries where unfair dismissal laws have their largest impact
in terms of cost per full-time employee.
5.2 The Freyens and Oslington (2005) survey
Freyens and Oslington (2005) report the results of a careful survey in which
they estimate the costs of redundancy and of firing a worker for cause.
I have no major issues with design and administration of the Freyens and
Oslington survey.19 However, I do have two issues with the way that Freyens
and Oslington interpret and use the survey results in policy analysis.
19The only minor issue that I have with their reporting of the survey results is that they
could have provided a better description and breakdown of the survey response rate.
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Table 11: Estimated lower bound of cost per full-time employee attributable to
unfair dismissal laws by industry and size of business
Size of business (number of full-time employees)
Industry 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 50 51 to 100 100+ Total
Manufacturing 259 935 540 157 682* 184* 444
Construction 85 261 257* 220* 132* 74* 154
Wholesale trade 44 150 467 440* 26* 183* 227
Retail Trade 205 59 133 198 70* 94* 138
Transport 591 265 64* 504* 30* 55* 353
Communications 579 192 359 697 108* 251* 426
Finance 45 755* 0* 348* 17* 8* 142
Health 118 164 183* 23* 0* 263* 157
Recreation 957 290 22* 375* 89* 29* 410
Accommodation 1087 1027* 453* 295* 0* 0* 488
* Note average is based on very few observations and should be treated with care.
The first issue relates to what costs are to be measured. Freyens and Osling-
ton measure only the costs involved in firing a worker for cause. There are
several other costs that need to be measured. The first of these comprise the
costs incurred by the business in reducing the businesses exposure to unfair
dismissal claims. These costs include the costs of the additional management
procedures necessary to reduce unfair dismissal claims. One reason that, com-
pared with Harding (2002), Freyens and Oslington underestimate the costs of
unfair dismissal is that they exclude these costs incurred by business in reducing
their exposure to unfair dismissal laws.20
The second issue is that Freyens and Oslington underestimate by an order
of magnitude the percentage of employees that are dismissed for cause per year.
Freyens and Oslington estimate, using the ABS (2001) Retrenchment and Re-
dundancy Survey, that each year 0.4 of one per cent of workers are dismissed
for cause. The problems with this number arise because it is calculated from a
survey of people not businesses. People may feel some shame in reporting that
they have been fired for cause and thus there will be under reporting. Second,
the survey leads to an estimate of the number of people who have been dismissed
at least once in a year this is diﬀerent from the number of dismissals per year.
Fortunately the Australian Workplace Relations Survey provides indepen-
dent evidence on the percentage of employees who were dismissed for cause in
1990 and 1995. The AWIRS survey indicates that 4.4 per cent of employees were
dismissed for cause in 1990 – an order of magnitude larger than the estimate
20Both Harding (2002) and Freyens and Oslington (2005) exclude the costs that arise be-
cause businesses dismiss fewer workers compared with a situation of no unfair dismissal laws.
These costs arise because the unfair dismissal laws result in businesses retaining some workers
whose marginal product is less than their wage – in the absence of the laws businesses would
have dismissed these workers for cause.
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used by Freyens and Oslington. The comparable number for 1995 was 2.1 per
cent.
6 Eﬀect of unfair dismissal laws on risk
So far the discussion has focused on the case where businesses are risk neutral,
an assumption that is not attractive when dealing with small business. The
following model allows us to obtain a ball park estimate of how much risk
matters.
Assume that each worker contributes $R0 in revenue and wages are $W0 per
person. Thus in the absence of dismissal costs The profit earned by a firm with
N0 workers is
Π0 = (R0 −W0)N0
Assuming free entry Π0 = 0 in a long run equilibrium.
Now suppose unfair dismissal laws are introduced. The probability that a
worker performs poorly is and is dismissed is p assuming that dismissals are
independent the number of dismissals per firm (n) is distributed as a binomial
with mean Np and variance Np (1− p). I assume to make the maths simple
that all dismissals have a cost c. The expected profit including dismissal now is
Π1 = (R1 −W1)N1 −Npc
In a long run equilibrium with entry Π1 = 0 and so the variance of profits is
V ar (Π1) = E (n−Np)2 c2
= Np (1− p) c2
Thus the standard deviation of profit per worker is c
q
p(1−p)
N so using Freyens
and Oslington’s estimated cost of a contested unfair dismissal claim of $14,0000
and setting the probability of dismissal at 0.02 as in the AWIRS data and
assuming that we find that the standard deviation of profit per employee is
1960√
N
. So for a business with 9 employees the unfair dismissal laws increase the
standard deviation of profits per employee by $653 per employee. But for a
business with 100 employees the unfair dismissal laws increase the standard
deviation of profit per employee by $196. Clearly, unfair dismissal laws impose
a much larger cost on smaller businesses in terms of the additional risk they
must bear.
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7 Policy discussion and conclusions
Unfair dismissal laws impose substantial costs on businesses they also confer
benefits on employees in terms of increased job security. Prior to the federal
unfair dismissal law being introduced 1993 few businesses provided protection
against unfair dismissal, this suggests that the costs of providing that protection
exceeded the benefits. Thus on balance the policy of removing the protection
from unfair dismissal laws is welfare enhancing.
One important caveat to the policy stance just taken is that it assumes that
employees and business are free to write agreements including unfair dismissal
provisions if those provisions are mutually beneficial. The Workchoices docu-
ment suggests that such provisions will be included in the prohibited material
listed in regulations promulgated by the Minister for employment and work-
place relations. If such regulations are promulgated and mutually beneficial
provisions regarding unfair dismissal are excluded from agreements then my ar-
gument above would have no foundation as it is based on the assumption that
business and employees are free to include in agreements provisions relating to
unfair dismissal.
Wage setting is regulated in Australia via awards which set minimum rates
of pay. Thus, when the unfair dismissal laws were introduced in 1993 business
could not obtain compensation through lower wage rates in the way that they
would in a less regulated labour market. The only margin on which Australian
business could adjust.
If one assumes that business is risk neutral then the fact that unfair dismissal
laws increase costs per employee by at least $296 suggests that with an elasticity
of labour demand of 0.7 employment is reduced by at least 0.46 per cent (about
46,000 persons). If the unfair dismissal laws are valued by employees then
increased labour will by supplied at each wage rate and thus unemployment will
increase by more than the fall in employment. It is important to emphasise two
things about this estimate. First, as discussed earlier their is nothing in the
Freyens and Oslington (2005) paper that would cause me to revise this estimate
downwards. Second, I have excluded the cost in lost productivity from workers
that business would have previously dismissed for cause. This means that I have
substantially underestimated the cost to business from the unfair dismissal laws.
Small and medium sized businesses are more likely than large businesses
to dismiss an employee for cause, this means that the unfair dismissal laws
impacted more heavily on small business than it did on large business.
The possibility of being subject to an unfair dismissal claim is a source of
risk for business. Small businesses have limited opportunity to pool the risk that
an employee dismissed for cause might initiate an unfair dismissal claim The
costs imposed on a business by this inability too pool risk is 3.3 times higher
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for a business with 9 employees than it is for a business with 100 employees.
This provides a further reason why unfair dismissal laws impose larger costs on
small business.
The fact that the unfair dismissal laws impose smaller costs per employee on
larger businesses means that the policy of exempting businesses with less than
100 employees will most likely not cause significant resource misallocation. On
the other hand it is not clear that the policy is necessary as larger businesses are
less likely to dismiss employees for cause than are smaller businesses. Removing
unfair dismissal laws for businesses of all sizes would achieve largely the same
economic outcome with a shorter and less complex act.
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Appendices
A The survey21
The survey was in the field from 17 July to 5 August 2002 administered by
Sweeney Research. The sample frame used for the survey is the Desktop Mar-
keting Systems (DtMS) telephone number database that lists all telephone num-
bers across Australia. The survey comprises a panel of small and medium sized
businesses selected from this database. That is, the same respondents are con-
tacted every three months. Each quarter some of the panel drop out. In the
latest wave this figure was 458 (25 per cent).
The sample is stratified according to industry, location and business size.
The details of response rates are in Table 1 below. The central point to emerge
from Table 1 is that there were very few cases (0.8 per cent) where the respon-
dents terminated during the interview. The main reason that a respondent was
not interviewed after contact was that the quota for the category in which the
respondent belonged was full. In total 1802 completed responses were obtained.
Sweeny Research uses the ABS Business Register to calculate weights that
can be used to factor responses up to make statements about the population of
firms. The weights are inversely related to the probability that a firm in each
stratum is selected into the survey. The strata in the survey comprise business
size (measured by full-time employees), sector, metro and non-metro region and
State or Territory.
Table 12: Survey response rate
Category Number Per cent
Refused 186 5.7
Quota full 910 28.0
Appointment made but not required 329 10.1
Terminate during interview 25 0.8
Interviewed and completed response obtained 1802 55.4
Businesses contacted 3253 100
Results from the survey when factored up suggest that in the population
79.1 percent of businesses had employees and 20.9 per cent had no employees.
Separate questions were put to businesses with no employees on the extent to
which unfair dismissal laws would aﬀect their future hiring decisions.
21These appendices come from Harding (2002).
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A.1 Methodological issues in the use of surveys to collect
evidence on the eﬀects of unfair dismissal laws
A.1.1 Open-ended versus closed ended questions
Much of the methodological debate in this area relates to the issue of the appar-
ent conflict between survey based evidence obtained from open-ended questions
and that obtain from closed-ended questions. An example of the former is pro-
vided by question 2h of wave 38 of the Yellow Pages Small/Medium Business
Questionnaire which ask firms to list "any particular barriers or impediments
which prevent you from taking on new employees at the moment". In the
July 2002 survey 5.6 per cent of firms mentioned employment conditions/unfair
dismissal/industrial relations/safety and health. Comparable findings were ob-
tained in the 1998 Yellow Pages survey and from the 1995 Australian Workplace
Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) which found that just 1.4 per cent of re-
spondents mentioned UFD laws as an impediment to taking on new employees.
In commenting on the 1998 Yellow Pages survey Waring and De Ruyter
(1999) state that22
. . . 59 per cent of small business proprietors who believed there
were barriers to taking on employees as of August 1998. It is also
interesting to note the converse 41 per cent of these businesses saw
no barriers to employment growth.
As can be seen, unfair dismissal laws do not even rate a specific
mention. They could be construed to come under the categories of
’employment conditions’ or ’red tape/regulations’. However, even
these two responses together comprised no more than 17 per cent of
respondents.
These interpretations of the survey evidence are incorrect as there will have
been impediments that were of secondary importance to each firm, and thus
were not mentioned, but which when aggregated over firms are important in
determining aggregate employment. Moreover, the key phrase in the particular
question is "prevent you from taking on new employees" many firms may agree
that UFD laws would influence their decision to employ but would be unwilling
to agree with the stronger statement centred on the word "prevent".
A related issue is that when asked an open ended question the respondent
is likely to answer in terms of what is ’top of mind’ at that instant. Even when
prompted with ’anything else’, respondents typically provide a small number
of factors rather than being exhaustive. Some evidence on this is provided
by Table 13 which shows that only 14.7 per cent of respondents cited two or
more impediments to taking on new employees and 4.8 per cent cited 3 or more
impediments. Because the responses are not exhaustive of the factors impeding
22Similar comments were made by Associate Professor Rosemary Hunter and Paul Ronfeldt
to the Senate hearing on 29 January 1999.
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Table 13: Number of impediments to putting on new employees, question 2h
July 2002 Yellow Pages survey.
Number of impediments mentioned Percent
0 42.1
1 43.2
2 9.9
3 3.2
4 1.4
5 0.2
6 0
Total 100
firms in taking on more employees one needs to be very cautious in the statistical
inferences that one draws from responses to such open ended questions.
The only valid inferences about UFD laws that can be made from the re-
sponses to open ended questions about factors impeding employment are:
• that for between 1.4 and 5.6 per cent of businesses (depending on whether
one looks at the AWIRS survey or the Yellow Pages Survey) UFD laws
are among the most important impediments to taking on new employees;
and
• that for most businesses UFD laws do not rate as the first or second most
important impediment to taking on new employees.
The key point here is that it is invalid to conclude, on the basis of few
responses mentioning UFD laws, that such laws are unimportant in influencing
firm’s employment decisions. In order to quantify the eﬀects of UFD laws on
firms one must ask firms direct questions about UFD laws. And, for the reasons
discussed above, in order to be able to make valid statistical inference about the
nature and magnitude of the eﬀect it is usually necessary to ask closed ended
questions.
A.2 Piloting of closed-ended survey questions
When asking closed-ended questions it is important that:
• the wording of the question makes sense to the respondent and seeks in-
formation that the respondent can reasonably be expected to possess;
• the range of responses allowed encompass the responses that the typical
respondent is likely to provide. That is one does not wish to ’censor’ valid
responses; and
• the range of questions asked cover the relevant issues that the respondent
would canvass in a longer more conversational type interview.
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In order to develop questions with these properties the questionnaire was
piloted with six firms. The piloting was done sequentially whereby an initial
questionnaire was developed and then put to the first firm. Questions that
proved diﬃcult were noted, as were response ranges that were inadequate. The
respondent was then asked whether they thought that the questions adequately
captured the eﬀect of UFD laws on their business and their responses noted.
The questionnaire was then adjusted in light of this information and put to the
next firm in the pilot.
With pilot subjects selected randomly, at each stage one can infer that one-
half of the population would have more problems with the pilot questions than
the respondent and one-half would have fewer problems. Thus when one reaches
the stage where the respondent raises no issues that would cause adjustment of
the questions, then it can be inferred that one-half of the population would
have no problem with the questionnaire. In the case at hand, the fifth and sixth
respondents in the pilot raised no issues that would cause the questionnaire to
be changed. Thus one can be reasonably confident that the questionnaire is
an instrument that adequately captures the eﬀect of UFD laws on small and
medium sized businesses.
A.3 What are leading questions and how was the ques-
tionnaire designed to avoid them?
In evidence to the 1999 Senate Committee Associate Professor Hunter criti-
cized much of the survey evidence regarding unfair dismissals as being based on
’leading’ questions. She observes that
It is what we call in law ’a leading question’. A question that
simply asks, ’Would you be more likely to recruit if you were ex-
empted from unfair dismissal laws?’ is inevitably going to achieve
a response which is very diﬀerent from the response that you would
get if you said, for example, ’What would help you to hire people?’
That is a more open-ended question which allows the respondent to
take into account the range of factors that might be impacting on
them rather than simply drawing attention to a single factor which
is presumed to be the only factor operating in this situation 23
The point made by Associate Professor Hunter is an important one but
unfortunately in the discussion cited above there is some confusion as closed-
ended questions are seemingly equated with ’leading questions’. This is not
correct. To understand why it is useful to refer to the Oxford Dictionary of Law
which states that a ’leading question’ is
23Professor Hunter, Senate 29 January 1999 EWRSBE 11.
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A question asked of a witness in a manner that suggests the
answer sought by the questioner (e.g. You threw the brick through
the window, didn’t you?) or that assumes the existence of disputed
facts to which the witness is to testify.24
Thus, a question can be considered as leading if it assumes the existence of
a fact that has not yet been established at the stage at which the question is
asked in the survey. Leading questions can be avoided in surveys by employing
screening questions that first establish the existence of a fact and then asking
only those respondents that have reported the existence of that fact to provide
more information about the extent or nature of the eﬀect.
For example, in the survey developed for this report, question 11 seeks to
establish whether or not the firm had permanent employees. Firms that had
employees were then asked the following question
Q12a Thinking about the processes and practices your business
uses to: recruit and select staﬀ, manage its workforce, and manage
staﬀ whose performance is unsatisfactory - which of the following
statements best describes the extent to which unfair dismissal laws
influence the operation of your business?
1. The laws have a major influence on what we do.
2. The laws have a moderate influence on what we do.
3. The laws have a minor influence on what we do.
4. The laws have no influence on what we do.
Those firms that responded that unfair dismissal laws have no influence on
what they do were asked no further questions about the eﬀect of those laws.
Firms that reported some eﬀect were asked questions about the nature and
magnitude of those eﬀects. Screening questions were used in this way later in
the survey to establish the existence of facts about the cost impost of UFD laws
before asking respondents questions that presumed the existence of such a cost
impost. In this way the questionnaire avoided asking leading questions.
To reiterate, the central point to emerge from the discussion above is that
one can only determine whether or not a question is leading by looking at its
place in the whole questionnaire and particularly at whether respondents are
asked appropriate screening questions to establish that an eﬀect exists before
they are asked about the nature or magnitude of that eﬀect.
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